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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
~I. A. SHAW, FRANK ARMSTRO·NG, 
et al., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Municipal 
corporation, et al., 
Defenda!nts and Ap,p1ellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CAsE No. 
7380 
The appellants in their brief have stated the facts 
disclosed at the trial of this cause very briefly and we 
do not feel that they inform the court sufficiently as to 
the location or the nature of the proposed operation. 
This is especially true in light of the fact that one of 
appellant's Assignment of Errors is "That the Cq!Jrt 
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erred in finding that the operation of defendants' pro-
posed plant would be a Nuisance." (Appellant's Brief 
Page 3). 
There are eighty-seven (87) parties plaintiff in this 
action. They are residents of what has been defined as 
the Cottonwood District in Salt Lake County. Plain-
tiffs Exhibit "A," which consi;sts of the present owner-
ship plats filed in the County Recorde·r's office of Salt 
Lake County, outlines the general area affected and 
locates the site of the proposed gravel mining and 
asphalt plant of Salt Lake County and also the proper-
ties of the plaintiffs in this action. The testimony is 
that the proposed plant as located on the Exhibit io 
located on a hill or bluff overlooking and to the east of 
the residences of most of the parties plaintiffs. Plrun-
tiffs Exhibit '' B'' is a panorama picture of the area 
and will apprise the Court of the nature of the terrain 
and identify the locations of the various points testified 
to at the trial. The other exhibits introduced by the 
Plaintiffs show the general nature of the home-a located 
in the area. 
The testimony is not disputed that the general area 
in which the Plaintiffs reside is the finest residential 
area in the State of Utah. (Trans. 15-19, R.ec. 7 6-80) 
The testimony is also undisputed that the only means of 
ingress and egreos to the plant is by means of a road 
running east and south from Holladay Boulevard and 
entering Holladay Boulevard at 5800 :South. 
This action was commenced by Plaintiffs before 
the proposed operation had actually commenced. Prep-
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3 
arations '\Yere at the ti1ne under way. The operation as 
proposed '\Vas described by Commissioner Greenwood, 
the County· Conunissioner in charge of roads and bridges 
as follows: (Trans. 185-186-187-188, Rec. 247, 248, 249, 
250). 
(a) One hot asphalt plant which has been called 
the Catmul Plant, the op·eration of which was described 
by the 'vi tnesses Nielsen (Trans. 81 to 85, Rec. 142 
to 146) and Higgins (Trans. 76 to 80, Rec. 137 to 142:). 
This plant ia powered by a diesel engine and the dryer 
fired by coal. 
(b) One 100 ton per hour jaw gravel crusher pow-
ered by a diesel engine. 
(c) One diesel powered bulldozer. 
(d) One diesel powered draglin,e. 
(e) Diesel or gasoline powered loaders. 
(f) 100 truck loads a day moving to and from the 
plant during the operation. 
The testimony of the witnesses Nielsen, Higgins and 
Butler are to the effect that the operation of this plant 
and comparable plants are noisy, du·.sty and that tar 
residue is emitted. 
It should be remembered that the descriptions of 
the witnesses Higgins and Nielsen covered only the 
operation of the Catmul asphalt plant and did not in-
elude the mining or crushing of gravel. The testimony 
of the witness Butler covered only the operation of the 
asphalt plant of Salt Lake City and did not cover these 
other operations. 
The testimony of Commissioner Greenwood is that 
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the operation of dies,el units is noisy. (Trans. 188, Rec. 
250) 
There is some conflict in the evidence as to the 
direction of the prevailing winds in the area. We will 
analyze this testimony in our argument. 
ARGUMENT 
We will argue the points of law raised by the appel-
lants in the same order as they are pres-ented in their 
brief. 
1. (a) Whet:her Salt Lake Couw.ty enjoys a sover-
eign immuwity, .as a political subdimision of the St.ate .of 
Utah wh!ich p'r'ecludes the m:aintewamae agaimS't it of this 
kind of action? 
'The answer to question (a) of app·ellants. brief also 
ans.wers (h). 
As we understand the points attemp·ted to be made 
under these headings it is simply that the sovereign 
cannot be sued unless express statutory consent is given 
and that the County as a creature of the s-overeign is 
immune. We will concede that a sovereign cannot be 
sued without its consent. We will further concede that 
the County is a creature of the so"Viereign. 
We believe the answer to the p·ropositions raised 
by appellants is definitely answered hy the Statutes. In 
defining the p~owers of the counties of this State the leg-
isla_ture has p~rovided: 
Title 19, Chapter 4, S·ection 3, Utah Code Annotated 
1943. 
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GENERAL POWERS 
~~_A .. county has power: 
(1) To sue and be sued." 
The appellants argument loses all of its substance 
because the State has never relinquish·ed its immunity, 
except in specific instances. State vs. District Court of 
Salt Lake County, 102 Utah 290, 128 P2nd 471. There 
is no statute under the provisions of which the State of 
Utah can ~ ' sue or be sued.'' Remedial action against 
the State is in the main allowed against the officers and 
commissions of the State, not against the State itself. 
The legislature has hy the enactment of the quoted 
statute specifically authorized suits against counties. The 
question as to whether or not the county is liable for the 
particular wrong alleged is an entirely different question 
which will be argued later. There is no statutory enum-
eration of the nature of actions which can be brought 
against the county. If the reasoning used by app·ellants 
were adopted then no action could be maintained against 
a county except those enumerated in 104-3-27 Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, which sets forth the actions which may 
be brought against the State. These actions are of a 
very limited nature and if this reasoning were sound, 
the question of the county's immunity from suit would 
have been raised many times. 
The mechanics for obtaining service against the 
county are specifically provided for in the statutes. 
Section 104-5-11 Revised Statutes of Utah 1943 provides 
in p-art: 
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'''The summons. must be served by delivering 
a copy thereof a.s follows : * * * 
(2) If the defendant is a county, to a county 
commissioner or to the county clerk of such 
county.'' 
There is no comparable ·section covering seTvice 
on the State. See State vs. District Court of Salt Lake 
County, supra. 
(b) The real question 11aised Ull"'tder ( 0) O:S we view 
it is not w·hether or not .the county is immune from suit 
by re·ason of its sovereignty, but ·w·hether the w~ong 
alleged is actionable ag·ainst the County. 
As has been stated in appellants brief this is an 
action in equity to enjoin a threatened nuisance. An 
action to enjoin or abate a nuisance is not pTedicated on 
negligence. 9 Am. Juris. 282. No relief is asked, except 
injunction against the proposed nuisance. 39 Am. Juris. 
282 says this among other things relative to the· nature 
of an action based on nuisance. 
'' * * * and it has been said that an action 
for a nuisance which violates a prop·erty right 
incident to the ownership of land is in the nature 
of one for tres:p,ass to realty.'' 
The pleadings, p•roof and findings of fact iil this 
case support the proposition that unless the operation 
of the ·proposed plant be enjoined there would be a 
violation of a property right incident to the ownership 
of land by reason of the dust, odors and noise which 
would inevitably result from the operation of the plant. 
This court has held that injunction will lie against 
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a county for trespass. The case of Aagard vs. Juab 
County, 75 Utah 6, 281 (P) 728, was an action for dam-
ages against the Courity for land allege·d to have been 
taken by the County for a highway which land belonged 
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had not presented a 
claim to the county as provided by statute and because 
this had not been done the court rendered judgment fo'r 
the county on the pleadings. In reversing the District 
Court this court held that in an action such as the one 
brought it was not necessary to file a claim. In discuss-
ing the sufficiency of the complaint the court said the 
following: 
''In this p·roceeding a strip of land is the 
subject matter of dispute. The plaintiff alleges 
that he is the owner in fee simple of the land. 
While plaintiff specifically prays for a money 
judgment for the value of the land, in dispute, 
he also pirays for 'such further and other relief 
as may be just.' The facts alleged in the com-
plaint, if true, are clearly sufficient to entitle 
plaintiff to a decree quieting title to the land in 
controversy and to injunctive ~elief." (Italics 
ours) 
The appellants in their brief have quoted the rule 
as set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum as to the liability 
of a county for a v-uisance. 14 Am. Juris. 237 says the 
following: 
''Certain ·sp·ecific remedies such as injunc-
tion, quo warranto, may be invoked against coun-
ties.'' 
Also at page 218 is the following: 
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Sec. 52. ''There is authority for the view 
that a county may incur a tort liability in refer-
ence to one who stands in the relation of an 
adjoining proprietor to it. A county, in the con-
struction of a public work, is not p·rivileged to 
commit a nuisance to the special injury of the 
citizens. It is liable as a private individual in 
damage for such act." 
I 
The applicable rule is set forth in the ease of Young 
v-s .. Juneau County, 192 Wis. 646, 652, 212 N. W. 295, 
2"97 when the court said: 
"The doctrine of liability of a municipal cor-
poration in cases where the relation is that of one 
proprietor to another is so well entrenched in 
the jurisp·rudence of this State that it cannot be 
disturbed, and by this we do not indicate it should 
be. * * * In this case the county of Juneau main-
tained upon adjoining premises a defective engine. 
Although repeatedly warned of the defect, its 
officers and agents continued to use the same, 
with the result that the plaintiff sustained dam-
age, not as a traveJer, but as a prop·rietor. Under 
such circumstances the case is ruled by Matson 
v. Dane County (172 Wis. 522, 179 N. W. 774), 
sup·ra, and the cases there cited and considered, 
and the complaint must be held to hold that the 
defendant m'aintained a nuisance. If as an adjoin-
ing p·roprietor it violated a legal duty owing by 
it to the plaintiff, liability follows just as in the 
case of Bunker v. Hudson (122 Wis. 43, 99 N. W. 
448), supra. 
This case was cited with ap·proval in the case of 
Necedah Mfg. Corp. v. Juneau County, 206 Wis. 316, 
237 N. W. 227, 240 N. W. 405, 96· A.L.R. 4. 
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The appellants in their brief have cited the case of 
Lu~d vs. S·alt Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 200 (P) 515, 
in support of their theory of ·sovereign immunity and 
have quoted a portion of that case. We do not think 
the .case deals in any particular with immunity of the 
county from suit in tort actions. At most it deals only 
\vith the liability of the county for damages for the 
. negligent act of its employees. This was a case for 
damages caused by the county's emp·loyees allowing 
water from a reservoir to go into th·e fish ponds of th·e 
plaintiff while the reservoir was being cleaned. The 
action was based on three grounds: (1) for taking and 
damaging property for 'public use; (2) Nuisance dam-
aging plaintiffs property; and (3) For negligence. The 
portion of the opinion quoted by ap,pellant de'als with 
the liability of a county for negligence. The court at 
page 555 of the Utah Reports discusses the case of 
Wendell v. Spokane County, 27 Wash. 121, 67 Pac. 576, 
91 Am. St. Rep. 528. The court distinguishes the case 
from the Lund case and in doing so quotes the following 
from the Washington case : 
'''This is an action for dam~ages caused by 
draining the waters of a lake in Spokane County 
onto the land.s of the plaintiffs, done by the order 
of the board ·Of C·ounty Commisslioners in con-
structing a road across said lake. 
The court found in this case that the County was 
liable for damages. 
In the case now hefore the court the p~roposed plant 
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was to be installed by order of the Board of County 
Commissioners. 
The appellanto. place some reliance on the case of 
Leibman vs. Richmond, 284 (P) 731, 103 Cal. App. 354. 
We think that case is clearly distinguishable from the 
case at bar. This was an action to abate the County 
Court House of Alameda County as a nuisance. Under the 
Statutes of California the County under exp.ress auth-
ority was directed to maintain a court house. There 
was another law which provided: 
''Sec. 3482 of the civil code provides. N oth-
ing which is done or maintaine·d under the expre~s 
authority of a statute can he deemed a nuisance.'' 
There is no exp·ress statute in the case he·fore the court 
which authorizes or directs Salt Lake County to oper-
ate a gravel mining and asphalt plant. Further we do 
not have a comparable statute governing nuisances such 
as California. 
We submit that a municipal corporation shall not 
be allowed to construct or maintain any plant which will 
work an irreparable hardship on the residents of the 
County. 
II. Whether, wnmer the evidence before the C'OUrt 
in this ,act)ion, a wuisamoe ·as (JJYb inevit~able result is est~ab­
lished. 
The assignment of error attacking the trial court's 
findings iB. so broad that it is impossible for us to deter-
mine just wherein the findings of the court were in error 
and what evidence is lacking to sustain the findings. 
Certainly under the former rule 26 of this court such 
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an assignment of error would not be considered by the 
court. Johnson et ux vs. Brinkerhoff et al( 57 (P) 2nd 
1132, 89 Utah 530. To,vnsend vs. Holbrook, 56 (P) 2nd 
610, 89 Utah 1-!7. Even under the p·resent rule to con-
sider such an assignment would be giving the rule a 
very liberal interpretation. 
The court may, in equity cases, review all of the 
evidence, but the findings of the trial court will not oe 
disturbed unless the findings are against the evidence. 
Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 (P) 2nd 252. 
We invite the court to read the evidence· in this case a.nd 
we submit that no finding made by the trial court is 
against the evidence. 
We now come to the question of the creation of a 
nuisance by reason of the proposed installation and 
operation of the plant. A public nuisance has been 
defined by the legislature. 103-41-3 Utah Code Anno. 
1943. 
''A public nuisance is ·a crime against the 
· order and economy of the state, and consists in 
unlawfully doing any act, or omitting to perform 
any duty, which act or omiasion either: ( 1) An-
noys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, 
health or safety of three or more ~persons;'' 
The governor may under the statutes direct the 
attorney general to abate such a nuisance. 
104-56-1 Utah Code Annotated 19f3 defines a private 
nmsance as: 
''Anything which is injurious to health or 
indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruc-
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tion to the free use of prop·erty, so as to inter-
fere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or 
property, is a nuiaance and the subject of an 
action. Such action may be brought by any 
person whose property is injuriously affected, or 
whose personal enjoyment is less·ened by the 
nuisance; ·and by the judgment the nuisance may 
be enjoined or abated, and damages may also 
be recovered.'' 
The evidence in this case discloses without con-
tradiction that the operation of the plant would he noisy. 
The testimony of Mrs. Speyer (Tr. 123, R.ec. 185), and 
Mrs. Mays (Tr. 118-A, Ree. 180), is to the effect that 
Mt. Olympus acts as a sounding board and that even 
the noise of the present limited operation by Mr. Harper 
is apparent. ·The limited operation conducted by Mr. 
Harper is deBcribed by him (Tr. 163, Rec. 225). He 
testified ~hat the only equipment used was a gravity 
loader and screener and at most 4 trucks. This court 
has held that noises and other disturbances may con-
stitute an actionable nuisance, especially in a residential 
neighborhood. Brough v. Ute Stampede As-Bn., 142 (P) 
2nd, 670, 105 Utah 446. 
The evidence as was stated in our statement of facts 
is that the op·eration of the so-called· Catmul p·lant ·and 
other comparable plants is dusty and that smoke and 
odors from hot asphalt and firing of boilers is emitted. 
This evidence is not seriously controverted. The only 
claim made by appellants in their brief in this connection 
is that the prevailing winds during the day time in this 
area are from the North and West and that the dust and 
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odors will be carried a \Yay from the residences. Indeed, 
this is the only argument made in the brief attacking the 
court's findings. The court after hearing all of the evi-
dence found in finding No.4 (Rec. 48) that the p-revailing 
winds were from the Southeast to the Northwest. This 
finding was based on the testimony of the witness Butler 
(Trans. 50, Rec. 111), who testified that he had made 
actual tests of wind currents at the mouth of Big· Cot-
tonwood Canyon. It \Yas further substanti~ated by the 
witness Mrs. Mays (Trans .. 118, Rec. 179) who had lived 
in the area all of her life. To controvert this testimony 
the appellants called Dr. Hawkes who testified that he 
had written a thesis on wind currents in mountain val-
leys but who had made no actual tests in this area.. We 
submit that the evidence clearly sus.tains the cour:t's 
finding. This court has held that dust and odors or 
either of them may constitute a nuisance even in areas 
which are not exclusively residential. 
Ludlow vs. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 
137 (P) 2nd 347,104 Utah 221; 
Thackery vs. Union Portland Cement Co., 
231 (P) 813, 64 Utah 437. 
The p~roof is also uncontradicted that there is a 
definite traffic hazard being;--£reated on Holl~aday Boule-
vard from the mouth of Big .. Cottonwood Canyon to Hol-
laday and that this traffic would be increased by 100 
truck loads per day during the summer months. See 
the evidence of Mrs. Speyer (Trans. 12'6, Rec. 188), 
and Mrs. Mays ('Trans. 1182A, Rec. 180). The case of 
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Benton vs. Kernan, 13 (A) 2nd 825, New Jersey, dis-
cusses excessive use of trucks and their effect on traffic 
as creating a nuisance in residential neighborhoods and 
holds that their operation may constitute a nuisance. 
It is the contention of these plaintiffs that any one 
of the activities proved would constitute a nuisance in 
this particular case. The case of Benton v. Kernan supra 
has this to say regarding the operation of a rock quarry 
in a residential neighborhood. 
"Considering the high-class residential char-
acter of the neighborhood, each of these noises 
is a nuisance in itself; but the medley of all of 
them, when the quarry is in full operation, pro-
duces such a din in the immediate neighborhood 
as to render normal conversation difficult.'' 
III. Whether, ev.en assuming such nruisa;nce to be 
the result of the defenrtarnts' activities, ,all-such activities 
should be p,ermanently enjoined under the facts a;rnd cir-
cumstamces of this case. 
S!alt Lake County has for years maintained and 
repaired the streets and roads within the County without 
operating an as-phalt plant in this residential area. The 
present Commissioner Greenwood, testified that there 
would be a saving of money for the asphalt used and 
that he favored the gravel at the Harper pit. There is 
no showing that there are not other available sites. There 
is a serious question as to whether or not any saving 
would be made on the asphalt used. 
The answer of the defendants did not set up or 
raise the issue of public good. All of the testimony 
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rel·ative to eosts "~as objected to at the trial by the 
plaintiffs. "\v"T e subn1it there is no showing that the public 
as a 'vhole 'vould be benefited. 
CONCLUSION 
All of the errors assigned by appellants have been 
answered. 
Counties are. created by the legislature and their 
powers and duties are defined by the legislature. The 
legislature has relinquished any immunity a county 
might have from suit by legislative enactment. 
The county cannot create a nuisance or deprive its 
citizens and residents of the quiet, peaceful enjoyment 
of their homes. 
All of the evidence conclusively establish~s the fact 
that any one of the operations contemplated would have 
created a nuisance, all combined would be intolerable. 
No public necessity for such an operation in this 
particular area was plead or shown. 
It is submitted that the rulings and the fiindings of 
the trial court were in accord with the law and the facts. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CRITCHLOW, WATSON & W ARNO·CK, 
Attorneys tor Plaintiffs and Resp~ondents. 
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